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Abstract. In this paper, we consider a number of different ways of rea-
soning about voting as a problem of conciliating contradictory interests.
The mechanisms that do the reconciliation are belief revision and be-
lief merging. By investigating the relationship between different voting
strategies and their associated counterparts in revision theory, we find
that whereas the counting mechanism of the voting process is more easily
done at the meta-level in belief merging, it can be brought to the object
level in base revision. In the former case, the counting can be tweaked
according to the aggregation procedure used, whereas in base revision,
we can only rely on the notion of minimal change and hence the syntac-
tical representation of the voters’ preferences plays a crucial part in the
process. This highlights the similarities between the revision approaches
on the one hand and voting on the other, but also opens up a number of
interesting questions.
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1 Introduction
In [GPR06], we pointed out that there are a number of similarities between the
areas of belief revision, belief merging and voting. These include
– resolution of conflicts, which in the case of revision and merging has to
do with avoiding/resolving inconsistency and in the case of voting it has to
do with conciliation of contradictory voting interests
– integrity constraints, which are implicitly given in belief revision in the
form of postulates and explictly given in the case of belief merging. In vot-
ing these are conditions on the aggregation procedures, e.g., fairness, non-
dictatorship, etc.
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– representation and manipulation of preferences which gives priority
to the new information in belief revision and to the integrity constraints in
belief merging. In the case of voting this has to do with the individual voters
preferences for candidate options.
The similarities are worth exploring for a number of reasons. In some cases
there is a very clear analogy (e.g., computation of a Kemeny consensus and
merging of knowledge bases in model-based belief merging). More importantly,
by investigating the similarities between the areas, we can bring solutions to
problems of one area to the others.
In this paper we seek to explore the underlying principles which are common
to these three processes by considering the voting problem under the perspective
of belief revision and belief merging and analysing the effects of the operations
on the voting scenario. We start by introducing the voting problem used in the
remaining of the paper.
2 Voting: aggregating preferences
The problem of voting is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences
in order to select a collectively preferred alternative. This problem is extensively
studied by social choice theory [Arr63,ASS02,Sen70]. Probably the most famous
method for the aggregation of preferences is the one proposed in the 18th century
by the Marquis de Condorcet. Given a set of individual preferences, we compare
each of the alternatives in pairs. For each pair, we determine the winner by
majority voting, and the final collective ordering is obtained by a combination
of all partial results. Unfortunately, this method led to the first aggregation
problem, known as the Condorcet paradox : the pairwise majority rule can lead
to cycles in the collective ordering. In other words, this ordering cannot be used
to select an overall preferred candidate.
Let C = {c1, . . . , ck} be the set of candidates. There are exactly |C|×(|C|−1)
distinct ordered pairs of candidates 〈ci, cj〉. In general, we speak of a binary
relation < on C2, where ci < cj denotes that candidate ci is (strictly) preferred
to candidate cj . The desired properties of preference relations associated to strict
linear orders are given below, where the variables {x, y, z} range over elements
of C.
(P1) ∀x, y, z((x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z) (transitivity)
(P2) ∀x, y(x 6= y → (x < y ∨ y < x)) (totality)
(P3) ∀x, y((x < y)→ ¬(y < x)) (asymmetry)
In Section 4, conditions (P1)–(P3) will be expressed in our propositional
language, but for now we leave them in the meta-level.
With the above formalisation, the Condorcet paradox can be expressed as
follows. Suppose that there are three possible candidates a, b and c (that is,
C = {a, b, c}) and three voters V1, V2 and V3, who express their total preferences
in the following way:
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V1 = {a < b, b < c}
V2 = {b < c, c < a}
V3 = {c < a, a < b}
According to Condorcet’s method, a < b has the majority of the voters (V1
and V3), so does b < c (V1 and V2) and, so does, c < a (V2 and V3). This leads us
to the collective outcome a < b, b < c and c < a, which together with transitivity
(P1) violates (P3) (asymmetry).
Unfortunately, this is not a particular problem of Condorcet’s method. More
recently, the aggregation of preferences was investigated by K. Arrow, who
proved an important result which became known as “Arrow’s impossibility the-
orem”, stated below.
Let X be a non-empty set of mutually exclusive social states and ≤i be a
total, reflexive and transitive preference relation for an individual i over the
states in X (and <i its strict counterpart).
Suppose there are n individuals V = {V1, . . . , Vn} in the society. A social
welfare function (SWF) is a function that produces a total, reflexive and tran-
sitive social preference relation  from a given n-tuple of individual orderings
{≤1, . . . ,≤n} (again we use ≺ to denote ’s strict counterpart). A tuple of n
rankings one for each individual over the set of alternatives is called a profile.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that whenever |X | > 2, the following
conditions become incompatible:
(Universal domain) The social preference function should be able to cover all
admissible individual preference relations.
(Independence of irrelevant alternatives - IIA) The social preference on any
pair of alternatives depends exclusively on the individual preferences over that
pair.
(Non-dictatorship) There is no individual i such that for each {x, y} ∈ X
and every profile 〈<1, . . . , <i, . . . , <n〉, x <i y implies x ≺ y.
(Weak Pareto principle) if for all i, x <i y, then x ≺ y (this principle is also
called unanimity).
3 Aggregating preferences via belief revision
One way of analysing the interaction between belief revision, merging and voting
is to express voting principles in a logical framework and then consider what
belief revision and belief merging would do in specific voting scenarios. We start
by considering a logic theory of order and its relation with belief revision.
Consider the language of predicate logic with binary relation<; the constants
a, b, c and the equality symbol =. Assume the axioms ∀x(x = a∨ x = b∨ x = c)
and a 6= b 6= c (this means ¬(a = b) ∧ ¬(b = c) ∧ ¬(a = c)). Let T be Cn({a <
b, b < c, c < a}) and consider an input τ to T saying that < is the strictly linear
order of the three elements a, b, c, i.e., τ = P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3.
It can be clearly seen that both a < c and c < a follow from T + τ and
this contradicts P3, hence T + τ is not consistent. If we want to analyse what
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aspects of T are compatible with a strict linear order of a, b, c, we can consider
the revision of T by τ . This would replace T + τ with a new consistent theory
T ◦ τ containing τ , by making minimal changes in T . As we saw in Section ??,
the AGM postulates constrain how the new theory T ◦ τ is related to τ and to
T . The new theory T ◦ τ is closed under logical consequence, i.e., if T ◦ τ ⊢ A
then A ∈ T ◦ τ , but the AGM framework does not give an algorithm for how to
find any such T ◦ τ . One algorithm which can do the job is given below.
Starting with T⊥¬τ = {T1, T2, T3, ...}, T ◦ τ can be constructed from any
Ti ∈ T⊥¬τ , say Cn(T1 ∪ {τ}) (this would give a maxichoice revision of T by
τ). We can find such Ti ∪ {τ} by listing all sentences which T proves as the
list A1, . . . , An, . . . and defining a sequence S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2, . . . as follows. Let
S0 = {τ} and for n ≥ 0, define define Sn+1 in the following way
Sn+1 =
{
Sn ∪ {An+1}, if this set is consistent
Sn, otherwise
Finally, let S =
⋃
i∈N Si.
If we want to look at what we retain from our original T , we see that S−{τ} ⊆
T is a maximal subtheory of T consistent with τ , i.e. S − {τ} = Ti for some i.
Which Ti we get depends on the way we present T as a sequence.
Let us now see what happens if we apply these procedures to our concrete
example. τ says that {a, b, c} is strictly linearly ordered. T says that a < b and
b < c and c < a. T is not consistent with τ . The maximal subtheories of T
consistent with τ include:
T1 = Cn({a < b, b < c})
T2 = Cn({b < c, c < a})
T3 = Cn({a < b, c < a})
When τ is added to these, we get the three options for revision below:
V1 = Cn({a < b, b < c, τ}
V2 = Cn({b < c, c < a, τ}
V3 = Cn({c < a, a < b, τ}
Note that this logical revision philosophy/approach is entirely compatible
with AGM revision and hence uses three basic assumptions:
1. We must replace the inconsistent T + τ by a single consistent theory T ◦ τ .
2. This replacement contains τ and as much of T as possible. Certainly we do
not want anything not in T to be admitted to T ◦ τ , even if consistent with
it.
3. We are dealing with two valued logic. In other words, preferences have to be
represented as yes/no statements (as opposed to numerical, probabilistic or
fuzzy values).
From the revision point of view, our voting example consists of three can-
didate options a, b and c and several voters who express their total preferences
regarding these options. When put together these preferences result in the theory
T . So, for example, we could have had the following preferences:
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Voter 1 — a < b, b < c
Voter 2 — b < c, c < a
Voter 3 — c < a, a < b
Since we need to make a group decision here, we require a compromise func-
tional H based on the preferences of Voter 1, Voter 2 and Voter 3, motivated by
some general principles, such that:
H(Voter 1, Voter 2, Voter 3) = Some compromise preference, (i.e., tech-
nically some new voter).
We have some reasonable conditions on H , for instance, those given in the
latter part of Section 2. One such condition is that it does not choose as com-
promise one of the voters — the non-dictatorship requirement. In practice, this
means that we do not want H to be a projection. Another condition is the prin-
ciple of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), i.e., the group decision on
how two distinct elements x and y relate (x < y or y < x) depends only on how
the different voters voted on their relationship. Note that whereas the principle
of non-dictatorship is a purely meta-level one on the function H and does not
make use of the contents of the theories Ti, (IIA) relates to the properties of the
order predicate of Ti.
Let us now look at our revision example from the voting point of view. The
consistent theories T1, T2, T3 can stand for voters. The sentence τ is a statement
of the layout of the voting system. It specifies the alternatives {a, b, c} and says
that the combination of the voters preferences is strictly linearly ordered. We
immediately observe that the theory T can be obtained back from the voters as
the result of majority vote.
a < b is voted by V1, V3
b < c is voted by V1, V2
c < a is voted by V2, V3
We now have a voting interpretation of our revision theory situation. What
does maxichoice logical revision do in this situation? It simply chooses a dictator.
This is not always the case. We can construct a consistent theory T from a
number of voters V1, V2, . . . that is incompatible with the voting rules τ , but
whose subsequent revision by τ will not necessarily pick a dictator even if the
revision turns out to be maxichoice. This is illustrated below.
Let V1 = {a < b, b < c, a < c} and V2 = {c < b, b < a, c < a} and τ be the
voting rules as before. Now take T = V1 ∪ V2 = {a < b, b < c, a < c, c < b, b <
a, c < a}. T is consistent, since it does not know about the properties of linear
orders. If we now enforce these, i.e., revise T by τ , a maxichoice revision would
look at T⊥¬τ . One of the sets in T⊥¬τ is, for instance, {a < c, c < b, a < b} which
together with τ would result in a strict linear order which does not correspond
to either V1 or V2. In the voting example, this is may be a desirable outcome.
Let us return to the expectations of voting theory from the point of view of
revision theory. Voting theory expects some compromise vote satisfying certain
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conditions. Belief revision tries to find some compromise between all the Ti ⊆ T
that are consistent with τ . It will seek some compromise theory Scomp which will
be acceptable to all. This is left mostly for a selection function.
Maxichoice revision operations look at all Ti′s and sets T ◦τ as Ti+τ for some
Ti. In general, this Ti is not constrained at all on containing consequences of all
of the voters. Full meet revisions will be too restrictive and comprise only the
consequences of the voting system τ (since s(T⊥¬τ) = ∅). On the other hand,
partial meet revisions would be based on the particular subsets Ti picked by s
which again could leave the wishes of some voters out — an unfair prospect.
Therefore, an acceptable Scomp from the voting point of view would have to rely
on some meta-level principle in the case of AGM revision functions. What can
we then expect of the relationship between Scomp and AGM? In summary,
1. If we stick with AGM, certain conditions of the voting system (τ) can be
enforced, but we cannot ensure a fair outcome unless we also adopt some
meta-level principles.
2. However, the AGM postulates may hold for a desirable Scomp even though
they do not incorporate themselves any fairness principles from the voting
point of view.
4 Voting as belief merging
We now want to express the ideas presented in Section 2 in the context of belief
merging. For this we use a propositional language L and associate to each pair
of candidates ci, cj taken from C, a propositional variable “ci < cj” implicitly
meaning that candidate ci is preferred to candidate cj .
We use P to denote the set of all propositional variables of L constructed
in this way. Complex formulae of L are defined as usual. We assume the usual
semantics for L and use the symbol W to denote the set of all of its valuations.
A set of propositional variables ∆ is a faithful representation of a strict total
order < on C if the following conditions are met
(P1): ci < cj ∈ ∆ and cj < cm ∈ ∆ implies ci < cm ∈ ∆ (P1)
(P2) and (P3): for every pair {ci, cj} of distinct elements ci, cj ∈ C, either
ci < cj ∈ ∆ or cj < ci ∈ ∆, but not both
(MIN) no other propositional variables appear in ∆
In general, we would like to consider sets containing any complex formulae,
so we need to impose some conditions on these sets as to what constitutes a
faithful representation of a strict total order on C. We do this by defining the
integrity constraint τ in the language L as follows.
τ = τ1 ∧ τ2
where
τ1 =
∧
i6=j 6=m
[(ci < cj ∧ cj < cm)→ ci < cm]
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and
τ2 =
∧
i6=j
[ci < cj ∨ cj < ci] ∧ [ci < cj → ¬cj < ci]
τ1 and τ2 must be constructed for every distinct pair of candidates taken
from C. The first conjunct of τ2 can be rewritten as ¬ci < cj → cj < ci, and
hence τ2 can be rewritten as ci < cj ↔ ¬cj < ci.
Proposition 1. For every strict linear order <′ on C, there is a valuation w
in mod(τ) such that x <′ y iff w  x < y.
Proof. This is easy to see. We can simply construct the valuation w, by consid-
ering every pair of candidates x, y and making w(x < y) = 1, w(y < x) = 0 if
x <′ y and w(x < y) = 0, w(y < x) = 1, otherwise. We then need to show that
w ∈ mod(τ), but this is straighforward. By construction, τ2 is satisfied by w. τ1
is also satisfied by the fact that <′ is transitive.
Proposition 2. For every valuation w in mod(τ), there exists a strict linear
order <w such that w  x < y iff x <w y.
Proof. Pick a valuation w ∈ mod(τ). By construction, w will assign values to
every variable x < y associated to every ordered pair 〈x, y〉 in C. We can then
contruct a strict linear order <w, by making x <w y iff w  x < y. We then
need to show that <w is not reflexive, that it is antisymmetric, transitive and
total. Construction guarantees that <w is not reflexive and that it is total. Since
w ∈ mod(τ), then w  τ1 ∧ τ2. τ1 guarantees transitivity and τ2 guarantees
antisymmetry.
If there are no extra propositional variables in L apart from the ones necessary
to represent <, then there is a correspondence between mod(τ) and the set of
all strict linear orders. We will assume this is the case here and use w< to denote
the valuation associated with a particular strict linear order < and <w to denote
the strict linear order with a particular valuation w.1
Example 1. Suppose our candidates are represented by the set C = {a, b, c}. For
this configuration, τ as defined above would be τ = τ1 ∧ τ2, where
τ1= [((a < b ∧ b < c)→ a < c)∧
((a < c ∧ c < b)→ a < b)∧
((b < a ∧ a < c)→ b < c)∧
((b < c ∧ c < a)→ b < a)∧
((c < a ∧ a < b)→ c < b)∧
((c < b ∧ b < a)→ c < a)]
τ2= [(a < b↔ ¬b < a)∧
(a < c↔ ¬c < a)∧
(b < c↔ ¬c < b)∧
Note that mod(τ) has exactly the following six valuations:
1 There is only significance in the uniqueness when we come to consider distances
between valuations for pairs of orders. If there is more than one valuation associated
with each order <, for a pair of orders <1 and <2, we will be interested in the
minimum distance between any two valuations associated with them.
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prop/val w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6
a < b 0 0 0 1 1 1
a < c 0 0 1 0 1 1
b < c 0 1 1 0 0 1
b < a 1 1 1 0 0 0
c < a 1 1 0 1 0 0
c < b 1 0 0 1 1 0
order c < b < a b < c < a b < a < c c < a < b a < c < b a < b < c
This is easy to see, since τ2 forces valuations to have symmetrical values
for ci < cj and cj < ci. We then only need to consider the eight possible
combinations of values for a < b, a < c and b < c. From these, w7(c < b) = 1,
w7(b < a) = 1 and w7(a < c) = 1, and w8(a < b) = 1, w8(b < c) = 1 and
w8(c < a) = 1, do not satisfy τ1. w1,. . . ,w6 correspond exactly to all possible
strict total orders on a set of three elements.
Definition 1. A voter Vi is a set of propositional formulae.
Voters in general need not be consistent, nor complete in their preferences.
However, some voters have special characteristics.
Definition 2. An opinionated voter is a conjunction of propositional formulae.
In other words, an opinionated voter wants all of his preferences to be con-
sidered atomically. It will prove useful to relate an opinionated voter with his
more flexible counterpart Vi and so we will denote the former using the symbol
V¯i. Similarly, a voter may have more or less information about his preferences
over candidates:
Definition 3. A well-informed voter is a voter whose propositional formulae
admit exactly one chain in C.
Definition 4. Let ∆ be a set of formulae.
mod(∆) = {w ∈W | w  ∆}
In order to use a specific merging operator introduced in [Kon99], we recall
the definition of the Hamming distance [Dal88]. However, the Hamming distance
is only one among many possible distance functions that we may use. In fact, as
shown in [KPP02], the logical properties of a merging operator do not depend
on the chosen distance.
Definition 5. Let w1 and w2 be two valuations in W . The distance d between
w1 and w2 is the number of propositional variables p, for which w1(p) 6= w2(p).
We now extend this notion to cater for distances between a single valuation
and a set of valuations:
Definition 6. Let w ∈ W and W ⊆ W . The pointwise distance between w and
W , in symbols d˚(w,W ) is defined as
min{˚d(w,w′) | w′ ∈W}
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We now define the model-based majority merging operator, as introduced by
Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez [KPP98].
Definition 7. Let V1,. . . ,Vn be n voters and IC a set of integrity constraints.
The majoritarian merging of V1,. . . ,V2 with integrity constraints IC, in symbols
MIC(V1, . . . , Vn), is defined as
MIC(V1, . . . , Vn) = {w ∈ mod(IC) |
∑
1≤i≤n
d˚(w,mod(Vi)) is minimum}
Definition 8. The Kemeny distance between two profiles P1 and P2, in symbols
dK(P1, P2), is defined as
dK(P1, P2) = |{(c1, c2) ∈ C
2 | (c1, c2) ∈ (P1 ∪ P2)− (P1 ∩ P2)}|
Proposition 3. For any two profiles P1 and P2,
dK(P1, P2) = d(wP1 , wP2 )
Proof. Straightforward, since d simply counts the propositional variables with
different truth-values in two valuations.
The result above was also proved in [EM05].
Definition 9. The Kemeny distance between a profile P and a set of profiles
P1, . . . , Pn, in symbols dK(P, 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉), is defined as
dK(P, 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉) =
∑
1≤i≤n
dK(P, Pi)
A profile P is called a Kemeny consensus of a set of profiles P1, . . . , Pn, if
dK(P, 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉) is minimum.
Definition 10. A candidate c is called a Kemeny winner if there exists a Ke-
meny consensus P in which c is minimum.
Proposition 4. Let V1,. . . ,Vn be n well-informed voters. wp ∈ Mτ (V1, . . . , Vn)
iff wp represents a Kemeny consensus Pw of 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉.
Proof. Since each voter Vi is well-informed, we can associate him/her to a single
profile PVi . Whether or not mod(Vi) is a singleton is irrelevant, since d˚(w, mod
(Vi) will pick the element in mod(Vi) with minimum distance to w. Now, it is
easy to see that for each w ∈ mod(τ), there is a profile Pw which represents w
and such that
d˚(w,mod(Vi)) = dK(Pw , PVi)
and hence
∑
1≤i≤n d˚(w,mod(Vi)) =
∑
1≤i≤n dK(Pw, PVi). Since the former is
minimum, so is the latter and therefore, Pw is a Kemeny consensus. The con-
verse is proved in a similar way.
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Proposition 5. A candidate x is a Kemeny winner for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 iff ∃w ∈
Mτ (V1, . . . , Vn), such that w ∈ mod(∧x 6=yx < y).
Proof. (⇐) Since w ∈Mτ (V1, . . . , Vn), by Proposition 4, w represents a Kemeny
consensus. Since w ∈ mod(∧x 6=yx < y), then x is minimum, therefore it is a
Kemeny winner.
(⇒) Suppose x is a Kemeny winner for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉. Then there is a Kemeny
consensus P in which x is minimum. Pick wP , such that wP represents P . By
Proposition 4, wp ∈ Mτ (V1, . . . , Vn). Since x is minimum in P , then x < y for
every y 6= x, and hence wp  ∧x 6=yx < y.
Note that in the above characterization, the actual election result was mostly
calculated in the meta-level. It was mostly the distance values (calculated outside
the logical theory) that determined how the votes were counted. To be more
general, we need to include the mechanism of counting the votes in the object
level itself.
5 Voting as belief revision
In the previous section, we had one preference relation < and the voters ex-
pressed their opinion as to how they wished < to be like. τ imposed further
conditions on such relation. Belief merging allowed us to do this directly, be-
cause the preferences of the different voters could be distinguished implicitly by
placing them in different belief bases. This is not the case with belief revision.
In order to distinguish the preferences of each voter we will need to do represent
them explicitly in the language.
In so doing, we will then also need to code the machinery that computes
the overall < from each of the individual voter’s preference relations. In order
to distinguish the overall social preference relation from that of the individual
voters, we will re-formulate the problem by introducing new symbols as follows.
We replace <M for < in τ (τ1 ∧ τ2) and introduce a collection of propositional
symbols Vi= {ci <i cj}, for each distinct pairs of candidates ci, cj ∈ C and voter
vi.
The set of the candidates and the set of the voters do not necessarily coincide.
When they do the above scenario represents a different aggregation problem
[AT05].
Now, in general, we will want to represent a voter’s Vi preferences through one
or more formulae taken from Vi. This could be done either by a set of formulae
or by a conjunction of formulae. We normally will not want the representation
of a voter’s preference to be a closed theory.2 In fact, a number of issues need to
be considered when choosing the most appropriate representation. Base revision,
for instance is syntax-dependent and this has a direct effect on the concept of
minimality. Revision is done by comparing consistent subsets of the original
belief base. In particular,
2 To be expanded...
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a) if we choose the representation of a voter’s preferences to be a single formulae,
then by doing base revision, the result will incorporate all or none of that
voter’s preferences. This is the opinionated version.
b) if we choose the representation of a voter’s preferences to be the set of propo-
sitional variables associated with each of his/her preferences for a candidate
ci over cj , it may be possible to retain at least some of these preferences in
the revision process. This approach is more flexible.
As we mentioned at the end of the previous section, we now want to simplify
the revision/merging mechanism by placing some of the machinery in the object
level. So we will now turn to this problem by considering base revision (instead of
belief merging), and hence we need to include in the object-level some information
about what it means to win the election according to some criteria.
Arguably, the simplest principle to incorporate is that of majority. We would
like to express under what circumstances the majority of voters prefer one candi-
date to another. This of course depends on the number of voters. In our example
with three voters, a candidate ci is preferred over candidate cj by the majority
of voters if and only if any two voters prefer ci over cj :
ci <M cj ↔ [((ci <1 cj) ∧ (ci <2 cj))∨
((ci <1 cj) ∧ (ci <3 cj))∨
((ci <2 cj) ∧ (ci <3 cj))]
We need a formula such as the above for each combination ci, cj such that
i 6= j. In other words, majority can be represented as the formula θM
θM = ∧ci,cj∈C,i6=j{ci <M cj ↔ [((ci <1 cj) ∧ (ci <2 cj)) ∨
((ci <1 cj) ∧ (ci <3 cj)) ∨
((ci <2 cj) ∧ (ci <3 cj))]}
This will only tell us that a particular candidate ci is preferred (by the
majority) over another candidate cj , when one of the disjuncts on the right of
the formula is true, i.e., two out of three of the voters. For larger number of
voters, one needs to calculate what the majority number m of voters is and
write formulae accordingly for each combination of m voters – a tedious and
repetitive process, but nevertheless easy to do. In order to be a Condorcet winner,
a candidate ci needs to be preferred by the majority over every other candidate
cj . Hence, for each ci ∈ C,
CW (ci) = ∧i6=jci <M cj
And there will be such a winner in a voting scenario, if one of the candidates is
a Condorcet winner, i.e.,
ECW = ∨ci∈CCW (ci)
Now that the machinery (i.e., the voting mechanism) is expressed in the
logic’s language itself, we can consider different combinations of revision mech-
anisms and constraints and compare what we get as the result of the revision.
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Note that we can at this point, choose to revise the machinery itself, but let us
leave this point for later and as such, require that the machinery is preserved by
the revision process. In order to accomplish this, all we need is to revise by the
machinery, because of the success postulate. We then need to decide what kind
of revision we want.
AGM belief revision itself is independent of the syntax form of the formulae.
This is due to the fact that what is revised is in fact a theory. As a result, voters’
preferences contain a lot more information than can be at first realised and one
needs to be careful to constrain exactly what is allowed to remain from that
original theory. In our case, each propositional symbol in a voter’s preference
representation is associated with a vote of that voter for one candidate over
another. In doing the revision we want to minimise the loss of these propositions.
Therefore, one reasonable way of seeing the process is to consider base revision
instead. Proper subsets of a voter’s representation will be associated with the
failure to satisfy all of that voter’s original preferences.
There are two ways of calculating the change to the original base. The first
one is to consider all maximal subsets of a belief base K that fail to imply a
sentence α, in symbols, K⊥α:
K⊥α = {K
′ ⊆ K | K ′ 6⊢ α and for every K ′′ ⊃ K ′, K ′′ ⊢ α}
Using the above notion, it is possible to define the revision of a belief base K
by a formula α, in symbols K ⋆ α by picking one element of K⊥¬α if any exists
and then expand it by α. If K⊥¬α is empty, we can simply take α itself as the
result of the revision:
K ⋆ α =
{
K ′ ∪ α for some K ′ ∈ K⊥¬α
{α} if K⊥¬α = ∅
This is the traditional way of evaluating minimal change to K. One could also
consider the subsets of K that are consistent with α and have maximum cardi-
nality (i.e., failure of set inclusion between sets is not sufficient to qualify a set
as maximally consistent). This can be formalised as follows:
K⊥cα = {K
′ ⊆ K | K ′ 6⊢ α and for every K ′′ ⊆ K, |K ′′| > |K ′|, K ′′ ⊢ α}
In [Kon99, Chapter 9], Konieczny’s investigated syntactic fusion operators.
One of the operators defined was a syntactic merging operator that selects a
consistent set with the maximum cardinality among all maximally consistent
subsets.
The base revision according to this policy can be defined in a similar way.
K ⋆c α =
{
K ′ ∪ α for some K ′ ∈ K⊥c¬α
{α} if K⊥c¬α = ∅
Definition 11 (Young winner). A Young winner is a candidate that can be
made a Condorcet winner by the least removal of voters.
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Proposition 6. Let B = ∪iVi and α = τ ∧ECW ∧ θM . B ⋆c α ⊢ CW (ci) iff ci
is a Young winner for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that B ⋆c α ⊢ CW (ci). We show that ci is a Young winner
for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉.
We first look at the sentence revising the belief base:
– τ says that < is a linear order
– θM defines what majority of one candidate over another means
– ECW requires that either a, b or c has a majority over every other candidate
These three formulae together basically require the revision to pick one total
linear order over the three candidates (this will be determined by the selection
function for ⋆c). The complications now have to do with the way we are allowed
to “count” the propositions in B (i.e., the votes).
Let us assume that the voters are opinionated. We know from the properties
of belief revision that B ⋆c α is consistent (since α is consistent), and that any
eventual inconsistency with B will be resolved by removing sentences from B.
Each sentence removed means “a voter” (since voters are opinionated). Suppose
that B ⋆c α ⊢ CW (ci), but ci is not a Young winner. Further to this, take B′ to
be the set in B⊥c¬α chosen by the selection function of ⋆c
Since ci is a Condorcet winner, there must be another candidate cj 6= ci who
can be made a Condorcet winner by the removal of less voters from B than the
number of voters removed to make ci a Condorcet winner. In other words, if B
′′
is set with the remaining voters, then it must be the case that |B′′| > |B′|, but
this is a contradiction, since B′ ∈ B⊥c¬α.
(⇐) This is easier to prove. Suppose that ci is a Young winner for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉,
but that B ⋆c α 6⊢ CW (ci). Since ci is a Young winner for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉, then it
can be made a Condorcet winner for 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 by the least removal of voters
from B. Since each voter is represented by a single sentence, then we must have
that
1. there is some B′ ∈ B⊥c¬α, such that the cardinality of B
′ is maximum and
2. ci is a Condorcet winner for B
′
Therefore, B ⋆c α = B
′ ∪ α ⊢ CW (ci), a contradiction.
However, notice that picking a voter as a set of propositional variables as
opposed to a conjunction of those symbols may potentially change the result
(needs to be proven!). Also, maybe a majoritarian number of voters have more
similar preferences and hence a dictator may not be elected.
Example 2. Consider the scenario described earlier on on this paper. τ = τ1 ∧ τ2
is exactly as in Example 1, except that we replace <M for <:
τ1= [((a <M b ∧ b <M c)→ a <M c)∧
((a <M c ∧ c <M b)→ a <M b)∧
((b <M a ∧ a <M c)→ b <M c)∧
((b <M c ∧ c <M a)→ b <M a)∧
((c <M a ∧ a <M b)→ c <M b)∧
((c <M b ∧ b <M a)→ c <M a)]
τ2= [(a <M b↔ ¬b <M a)∧
(a <M c↔ ¬c <M a)∧
(b <M c↔ ¬c <M b)∧
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The three voters are represented as the sets V1 = a < b < c = {a <1 b, b <1
c, a <1 c}; V2 = b < c < a = {b <2 c, c <2 a, b <2 a} and V3 = c < a < b =
{c <3 a, a <3 b, c <3 b}. θM will be the conjunction of formulae such as the one
below
a <M b↔ [(a <1 b ∧ a <2 b) ∨ (a <1 b ∧ a <3 b) ∨ (a <2 b ∧ a <3 b)]
and we will have one conjunct for each distinct pair ci, cj ∈ C. A candidate ci is
a Condorcet winner if the formula CW (ci) is true. For, say candidate a, this is
CW (a) = a <M b ∧ a <M c
and there will be a Condorcet winner if the formula above is true for one of the
candidates, i.e.,
(a <M b ∧ a <M c) ∨ (b <M a ∧ b <M c) ∨ (c <M a ∧ c <M b)
Now what happens when we revise V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3 = {a <1 b, b <1 c, a <1
c, b <2 c, c <2 a, b <2 a, c <3 a, a <3 b, c <3 b} by τ ∧ ECW ∧ θM? Since
V ∧ θM ⊢ a <M b ∧ b <M c ∧ c <M a and the latter formula is inconsistent
with τ , we need to retract some formulae and because of the way the revision
operation is defined, these can only be removed from V .
The inconsistency here can be solved by breaking the cycle a <M b ∧ b <M
c∧c <M a, i.e., by removing from V formulae that support the derivation of any
of a <M b or b <M c or c <M a. These were obtained by the formulae in θM ,
which defines majority. Therefore, the options are the ones enclosed in a square
in the tree below.
⊥
a <M b
θM a <1 b a <3 b
b <M c
θM b <1 c b <2 c
c <M a
θM c <2 a c <3 a
τ
There are hence six subsets of V that are maximally consistent with τ ∧
ECW ∧ θM (with respect to set inclusion). One just needs to remove any of the
formulae in the boxes above from V . Each removal will be associated with a
linearization of the candidates a, b and c in <M . For instance, B
′ = B\{a <1
b} ∧ α ⊢ b <M c ∧ b <M a, and hence we also get that CW (b). In this example,
any difference between ⋆ and ⋆c is only determined by the choice made by the
selection function. In other words, the maximally consistent subsets will all have
maximal cardinality.
Note that in this particular example, any of the three candidates can be made
a Young winner by removing exactly two of the voters (the other two). As we
said, the choice of winner will depend on the selection function used in ⋆c.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a number of different ways of reasoning about
voting as a problem of conciliating contradictory interests. The machineries that
do the reconciliation are belief revision and belief merging. The basic idea is
to code a particular voting scenario in a logical theory and analyse what belief
revision and belief merging do there.
Both belief merging and belief revision are based on an underlying notion
of minimal change which supports informational economy. However, there are
two major differences: 1) in the case of model-based belief merging, the principle
of minimal change is applied on top of an extra aggregation step performed
to compute the overal “distance” of a model of the integrity contraints to the
collection of belief bases 2) belief merging in general makes an explicit distinction
of the bases to be merged whereas in belief revision there is just one object of
revision. These differences need to be taken into account when we see the problem
of voting under the perspective of information change.
Since there is no structural distinction between bases in belief revision, when
we represent the voting problem in this scenario the only way we can differentiate
between voters’s preferences is to enrich the language, such that their preferences
can be kept apart, e.g., a <1 b and b <2 a for voters 1 and 2. In addition, we
also need to “code” the counting mechanism in the logic, for instance by saying
what it means for the majority of voters to prefer a to b.
Now to mimick the behaviour of the voting procedure in belief revision (resp.,
belief merging) we need to devise a logical theory of voting based on the par-
ticular voting mechanism in such a way that the elementary unit of change in
belief revision (belief merging) matches that of the voting scenario. We showed
that this is possible for the Kemeny and Young procedures.
By bringing the voting mechanims to the object level, we gain the ability to
reason about them in the language and more importantly the ability to use the
belief revision (resp., belief merging) m echanism itself to modify it.
So far we have limited ourselves to mimicking voting procedures in the infor-
mation change context. We would like to investigate in more detail the relation-
ship between other voting procedures and revision and merging to see what kind
of voting procedure we would obtain for a particular revision/merging strategy.
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